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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on November 29, 2012. At the close of the State's 
case in chief the Defense moved for a Rule 29 Judgment of Acquittal. The motion was denied. 
Tyler Howell was convicted by a jury of weapons aboard an aircraft. Mr. Howell Renewed his 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal in writing and submitted that to the Court on December 14, 
2012. That motion was denied by the Court without hearing on December 17, 2012 "for the 
same reasons articulated by the Court upon Rule 29 Motion at trial. Mr. Howell filed his Notice 
of Appeal on February 27, 2013; the District Court heard argument and took the matter under 
advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the 
conviction on September 4, 2013 and Mr. Howell now timely appeals. 
On appeal, Mr. Howell asserts the following: 1) the trial court erred when it admitted 
hearsay statements into evidence over Defendant's objections; 2) the trial court erred by failing 
to grant the Rule 29 motion where the State did not present any evidence as to whether the Boise 
Airport was a holder of a certificate issued by the federal government or the State of Idaho; 3) 
that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Howell 
attempted to knowingly take a weapon into a sterile area of an airport. 
Statement of the Facts 
Tyler Howell is a 28 year old husband and father who has lived in the Boise area for the 
last 15 years. (11/29/12 Tr., p.67, Ls.15-21.) Tyler was working two jobs; 1) at Allied Barton 
Security at the Capitol from 3:00 to 11 :00; and 2) at the Boise Airport for Delta Airlines. 
(11/29/12 Tr., p.68, Ls.5 - p.69 Ls.2.) As an airline employee Tyler gets flight privileges and on 
Saturday July 28, 2012 he and his wife and mother were attempting to fly to Minneapolis, 
Minnesota to go to the Mall of America. (11/29/12 Tr., p.69, Ls.3-22.) There were a number of 
flights leaving that morning, Tyler and his family were flying standby and were unable to get on 
the first two flights because there were no seats available. (11/29/12 Tr., p.69, L.23 -p.70, L.9.) 
There was about a four hour break between flights, so Tyler and his family decided to go 
home. (11/29/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-5.) Tyler and his family decided to take just one vehicle home, 
so they stopped by his motorcycle so he could transfer the contents of his motorcycle into a 
backpack that he could then just leave the items at home instead of in the airport parking lot all 
day. (11/29/12 Tr., p.70, Ls.14-20.) I always keep my weapon in whichever vehicle I drive. 
(11/29/12 Tr., p.70, Ls.20-24.) Tyler retrieved the contents of his motorcycle, placed them in his 
backpack and went home. (11/29/12 Tr., p.71, Ls.1-3.) Tyler had planned to leave the contents 
of his backpack there, but ended up just dropping the motorcycle off and leaving the residence 
with his wife and mother to hit a few yard sales. (11/29/12 Tr., p.71, Ls.4-6.) Tyler was initially 
going to leave his motorcycle in the airport parking lot because he had forgotten his helmet 
inside and did not want to take the time to go back in and get it, but then his cousin brought it out 
to him and it made more sense to just take the motorcycle home and ride with his family back to 
the airport when the time came. (11/29/12 Tr., p.71, Ls.7-18.) 
Tyler was only home long enough to drop off the motorcycle and hop in the other 
vehicle. (11/29/12 Tr., p.71, Ls.21-24.) Tyler kept his backpack with him for the purpose of 
potentially obtaining souvenirs from the Mall of America, that way they would not have to carry 
everything in their hands. (11/29/12 Tr., p.72, Ls.1-6.) When Tyler and his family arrived back 
at the airport for their third attempt at getting on a flight he placed his backpack on the security 
conveyor belt. (11/29/12 Tr., p.75, Ls.19-25.) Tyler walked through the scanner, waited at the 
end of the line for his item and realized a TSA officer was taking longer than normal to look at 
my backpack. (11/29/12 Tr., p.76, Ls.1-7.) At that point Tyler realized he had forgotten his 
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pistol in his backpack and stood there and waited for what was next. (11/29/12 Tr., p.76, Ls.7-
9.) Tyler explained that he worked for Delta and that he had placed the pistol in his backpack 
from his motorcycle and that he meant to take it home where he intended to leave it. (11/29/12 
Tr., p.76, Ls.14-20.) 
As an airline employee Tyler is issued a SIDA badge. (11/29/12 Tr., p.77, L.l.) A SIDA 
badge stands for Security Identification Display Area, this badge allows Tyler to get into secure 
areas of the airport. (11/29/12 Tr., p.77, L.2-4.) Tyler is not required to go through any type of 
security measures in order to report for work, in fact if he had wanted to get a weapon into the 




I. Did the trial court err in admitting hearsay statements into evidence over defendant's 
objections? 
IL Did the trial court err by failing to grant a Rule 29 motion where the State did not 
present evidence as to whether the Boise Airport is a holder of a certificate issued by 
the federal government or the State ofldaho, one of the elements of the crime? 
III. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Howell 




The Trial Court Erred In Admitting Hearsay Statements Into Evidence Over the Defendant's 
Objections. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Howell was given a citation for violation ofldaho Code§ 18-7503 Weapons Aboard 
an Aircraft on July 28, 2012. Mr. Howell asserts that the trial court erred by failing to sustain 
objections to Hearsay during direct examination of T.S.A. Officer Valero. Specifically 
statements with regard to whether the airport was federally certified. 
B. Standard of Review 
On appeal when a hearsay objection is overruled, the standard for reversal of that 
determination is if the error of allowing the hearsay to come in was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and therefore the jury would not have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence. The Idaho Rules of Evidence state that" ... a judgment 
will not be reversed for an error in an evidentiary ruling "unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected ... " I.R.E. 103. In a criminal case, therefore, error in the admission or exclusion of 
evidence will not result in a reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 120, 844 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Brazzell, 118 
Idaho 431,435, 797 P.2d 139, 143 (Ct.App.1990).State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700,705,889 P.2d 
729, 734 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. The Trial Court Erred When It Admitted Hearsay Statements of Johnny Valero Into 
Evidence Over Mr. Howell's Objection. 
"To hold the errors are harmless, the Court "must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. 
Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113, 106 P.3d 436,439 (2005). 
Mr. Howell contends that the trial court erred when it failed to sustain objections to 
hearsay evidence. At trial, the State offered the testimony of three witnesses. The State's first 
witness, James Trotter, offered the following testimony regarding whether the Boise Airport is 
federally certified: 
Q. And do you know whether or not that facility, the Boise Airport, is a federally 
certified facility? 
A. It is. 
[Defense counsel]: Objection, foundation, hearsay, and best evidence. 
The Court: Ms. Musser 
[State]: Judge, Mr. Trotter has just testified that he's a transportation security officer at 
that location. And I believe it would be part of his job to know whether or not it's a 
federally certified facility. 
The Court: Well I'll sustain the objection for foundation reasons. 
Q. And through your training what types of facility did they tell you where you would be 
needed for your particular position with 
[Defense counsel]: Objection, Judge. It's still hearsay. This is an out of court statement 
that's being offered to prove the truth of the matter that this is a federally certified 
building or place or sterile area. There's been no certificate provided to defense 
throughout any discovery. And he's, even with his training - and the question 
specifically asked what did they tell you. This is an out-of-court statement being offered 
for the truth. 
The Court: I'll sustain the objection on hearsay for hearsay objections. 
(11/29/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.17 - p.9, L.4); (11/29/12 Tr., p. 10, Ls.7 -p.11, L.2) 
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The State's second witness Johnny Valero offered the following testimony on whether 
the Boise Airport is federally certified: 
Q. Now there was some discussion about a federally certified facility. Have you ever 
seen a federal certification for the Boise Airport? 
A. As far as? Could you-
Q. Do you know if it's a federally certified building? 
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. Again I'm going to go to foundation, hearsay and 
best evidence. 
The Court: Premature, Ms. Tolman, overruled. 
Q. [State] Do you know if it's a federally certified facility. 
A. As far as I'm concerned -that I know, yes. 
Q. Have you ever seen a federal certification? 
A. I have not. 
(11/29/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.8-21) 
The District Court held that Mr. Valera's statement was merely his "belief' that the Boise 
airport was federally certified and therefore it did not meet the definition of hearsay. (R., p.128.) 
Mr. Howell agrees with the District Court's definition of hearsay, namely "a statement, other 
than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted" I.R.E. 80l(c). (R., p.128.) Mr. Howell asserts that 
District Court erred in its analysis and that Mr. Valera's statement was not the hearsay which 
was being objected to, the out of court statement which was being objected to is the certificate 
itself, the testimony which was being proffered by the State is that the airport was in fact 
federally certified or the holder of a certificate issued by the federal government or the state of 
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Idaho; that is the out of court statement which was being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted which Mr. Howell objected to 
During jury deliberations the jury submitted three questions, in writing, to the Court: 1) 
What is the "certificate" that would be issued by the federal government or the State of Idaho; 2) 
Is this "certificate" to act as an airport; 3) Lines 3 and 4 on instruction #13 are unclear, please 
provide clarification. 
A jury's finding will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence 
upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden 
of proving the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Marsh, 153 Idaho 360,365,283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct.App. 2011). Further, appellate courts do not 
substitute their view for that of the trier of fact as to the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence. State v. Knutson 121 Idaho 101, 104, 8222 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App. 1991). 
Finally, "To hold the errors are harmless, the Court "must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence." 
Robinett, 141 Idaho at 113, 106 P.3d at 439. 
In State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742, 302 P.3d 367 (Ct.App.2012) the Court of Appeals 
was asked to look at the issue of the persistent violator enhancement. In that case: 
"during deliberations, the jury sent three separate notes to the court 
pertaining to the lack of evidence identifying third degree assault as a felony 
under Oregon law. The court directed the jury to continue deliberations, and the 
jury ultimately found that McClain had been convicted of felony assault in 
Oregon. When McClain later filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
persistent violator enhancement, the district court denied the motion. 
McClain asserts that on this record it is apparent that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the Oregon conviction was for a felony. We agree." 
Id. at 748. The Court held that the record plainly did not indicate whether a third degree assault 
was a felony, and no other evidence in the record answered that question. The Court further 
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indicated that the State did not introduce copies of the applicable Oregon statutes that could have 
identified the offense as a misdemeanor or as a felony. 
Mr. Howell asserts that the trial courts error in allowing hearsay testimony into the record 
is not harmless. As is similar to McClain, based on the questions from the jury regarding the 
"certificate" and the elements instruction, the lack of evidence in the record to establish that the 
Boise Airport was the holder of a certificate issued by the Federal Government or the State of 
Idaho and the lack of any certificate being introduced into the record which could have shown 
that the Boise Airport was in fact certificated; it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Grant A Rule 29 Motion Where The State Did Not Present 
Evidence As To Whether The Boise Airport Is A Holder Of A Certificate Issued By The Federal 
Government Or The State Ofidaho, One Of The Elements Of the Crime. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Howell asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion made pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Mr. Howell asserts that the evidence 
presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction under Idaho Code § 18-7 503. 
B. Standard of Review 
The rule is settled that when a defendant introduces evidence, he waives any objection to 
the denial of his motion to acquit at the close of the government's case. State v. Watson, 99 
Idaho 694, 698, 587 P.2d 835, 840 (1978). If a defendant elects not to stand on his motion and 
presents evidence in his defense, the appellate court must then consider all the evidence, and if it 
is sufficient to sustain the conviction, the defendant cannot complain that his motion for acquittal 
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made at the close of the state's case was denied. Id. However, in this case the defendant 
renewed his motion for a Rule 29 at the close of all the evidence and the question on appeal then 
becomes the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. On review of the denial of a motion for a judgment 
of acquittal, the appellate court freely reviews the record, drawing all inferences in favor of the 
State, to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the challenged conviction. 
State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 813-14, 864 P.2d 644, 651-52 (Ct.App.1993). 
C. The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Grant Mr. Howell's Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal Where The State Did Not Present Evidence As To Whether The Boise Airport 
Is The Holder Of A Certificate Issued By The Federal Government Or The State Of 
Idaho, An Element Of The Charged Offense. 
The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 569-70 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 
942, 188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008). This standard of proof plays a vital role in the American scheme 
of criminal procedure because it provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence--
that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 
L.Ed.2d 368, 374-75 (1970); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 
(Ct.App.2010). 
The only evidence which was offered by the State to prove that it was the holder of a 
certificate issued by the Federal Government or the State of Idaho was by the State's third 
witness Michael Lock. He testified to the following: 
Q. Do you know if the Boise Airport is federally certified? 
A Yeah, it's a category three. I can't recall. I think that's what it is. And what they do 
is, because of the size of the airport and the amount of traffic that comes in there and 
the type of airlines that are serviced at the airport, then there's different categories. 
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And I'm not sure if it's a category three or not. I don't know if it's expanded 
since they expanded the runways and they can handle bigger places like 747s and 
stuff like that. They don't regularly service those aircraft. They're usually 737s and 
DC 1 Os so it depends on the type of aircraft and if it's an international airport. 
I mean, they have these different ratings for the different airports. And then they 
would have different regulations that the airport would have to follow to operate and 
be certified. 
(11/29/12 Tr., p.39, Ls.1 -19) 
In his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29, Mr. Howell asserted that 
no certificate had been provided and pursuant to the best evidence rule; I.R.E. 1001, 1002 & 
1003 the element of whether or not the airport is a holder of a certificate issued by the federal 
government or the State of Idaho had not been met. 
The Court in its denial of the Rule 29 motion stated as follows: 
"The question is how does the State have to do that? They can do that by getting 
a certificate that proves it is a certified airport federally or through the State of Idaho. 
But they don't have to prove it that way if they are able to prove it a different way. 
I don't believe that the best evidence rule applies. The best evidence rule says 
that if you provide a document and there is any dispute as to the authenticity of that 
document, we need to have the original document. 
"The State has provided evidence through the testimony of Officer Lock. And I 
wrote down what Officer Lock said, because, Counsel, I was looking for it. I knew that 
the State was going to be required to prove it. I knew that they hadn't proven it through 
the two witnesses that they had initially submitted to the Court, Mr. Trotter and Mr. 
Valero. 
So when the State called its third witness. Mr. Lock, I was looking for it. And 
Mr. Lock indicated in his testimony, "Boise Airport is federally certified as, I believe, a 
category three." 
That may not be the category that they are currently certified because things have 
changed and it may be a different category .... That question was asked pointedly by the 
prosecutor. It was responded to with an affirmative yes, it is federally certified. 
That, coupled with the testimony from Mr. Trotter and with the testimony from 
Mr. Valero regarding who they are employed by, the agencies that they are employed by, 
that inferential evidence in conjunction with the direct evidence provided by Officer Lock 
I believe is sufficient for the State to at least have the jury make a conclusion as to 
whether or not the State met that element." 
(11/29/12 TR., p.64, Ls. 17-25; p.65, Ls. 6-25; p.66, Ls.1-8) 
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The evidence presented by the State was insufficient to sustain a conviction for weapon 
in a sterile area a violation ofl.C. § 18-7503. Further, the trial court erred in its belief as to what 
Mr. Lock testified to. The question to Mr. Lock was "Do you know if the Boise Airport is 
Federally Certified?" not "Is the Boise Airport federally certified?" The answer Mr. Lock gave 
was "yeah" and that was in response to the question about his knowledge of whether or not the 
Boise Airport was federally certified not whether or not the Boise Airport was actually certified. 
Further, there was no testimony regarding whether the Boise airport was federally certified on 
July 28, 2012. 
Mr. Howell can only be found guilty under Idaho Code § 18-7503 if the State proved, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the airport was the holder of a certificate issued by the federal 
government or the state of Idaho. This is similar to State v. Morales, 127 Idaho 951, 908 P.2d 
1258 (Ct.App.1996), which held that the nonexistence of a concealed weapon license is an 
element of the crime of carrying concealed weapon, and the State bears burden of proving that a 
person charged with that crime is not licensed to carry concealed weapon. In that case the court 
held that the State bore the burden of proving the lack of a license. 
Here, the State bears the burden to prove the airport is certified, and even further to prove 
that the airport was the holder of a certificate issued by the federal government or the State of 
Idaho on July 28, 2012. The element of whether the airport was the holder of a certificate issued 
by the federal government or the state of Idaho was not met because the testimony provided by 
Officer Lock was in response to his knowledge of whether the airport was federally certified, he 
never actually answered a question on point as to whether the airport was in fact certified and it 
is further evident by the jury questions which were submitted, in writing, to the court during 
deliberations. 
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The trial court erred in its rationale regarding the best evidence rule and the District Court 
erred when it affirmed that ruling allowing the jury to infer that the Boise airport was a federally 
certified facility. The best evidence rule applies to this case because the State sought to prove 
the contents of a written certificate. Not only was officer Lock testifying to his knowledge of 
whether the Boise airport is certified, but he was also testifying to the content of the written 
certificate. More importantly, his testimony about the content was hardly definite or specific. 
The District Court in its analysis agreed with the trial court and held that the "jury was 
entitled to provide this testimony, and the inferences noted by the magistrate sufficient weight to 
support its finding ... that the Boise airport was a federally certified facility. (R., p.130). This 
analysis is incorrect and flawed as the Court is allowing the jury to rely on secondary evidence 
and inferences to prove an element of the crime which does not comport with the best evidence 
rule. I.R.E.1001, 1002 & 1003. Pursuant to the rule, the element must be proven with direct 
evidence (the certificate itself or a copy), if the evidence exists, unless the State presents 
evidence as to why that direct proof is unavailable. 
The best evidence rule applies to cases where a party either proffers a copy instead of an 
original document or when the original has been lost or destroyed. In the case of a lost or 
destroyed original, the proponent must show to the satisfaction of the court that he was unable to 
find the original or that it was destroyed through no fault of his own. Here, it appears that the 
State refused to produce even a copy of the certificate and did not attempt to explain its inability 
to do so. Instead, the State has in effect said, "Just trust me. There is a certificate-I've seen it. 
I'm pretty sure this is what it says." The rule applies in this case to ban any and all testimony 
about the contents of the certificate and whether or not the Boise airport was in fact the holder of 
certificate issued by the federal government or the State of Idaho. 
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In Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 391 P.2d 344 (1964) the Court held that the Best 
Evidence Rule did not apply because the witness was not testifying about the contents of a 
writing but merely testifying that a writing had been made. In Farmer v. International Harvester 
Company, 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306, (1976): the Court held that the Best evidence rule was 
not applicable because testimony did not attempt to prove the contents of any writing and the fact 
of recordation was incidental in circumstances of this case. The appellant in that case argued 
that the trial court erred in permitting Farmer to testify about impairment of his earning capacity 
without requiring him to produce written business records. The mere existence of written records 
does not render otherwise adequate, definite, specific and competent testimony ipso 
facto speculative or uncertain. Id. at 745. In that case, the Plaintiffs-respondents were not 
attempting to prove the contents of any writing and the fact of recordation is incidental or 
collateral in circumstances such as in the case at bar. 
In contrast in Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 596 P.2d 429, (1979). The 
Court held that photocopies of original promissory notes were admissible under an exception of 
the best evidence rule for lost documents. The appellants in that case further argue over the 
admission of several promissory notes entered into between Idaho First National Bank and 
Powell Feed Lots, Inc. Appellants argue that the bank failed to establish sufficient foundation to 
authenticate the notes and that admission of photocopies of the promissory notes violated the 
"best evidence rule." 
Admission of photocopies of the original promissory notes was permissible under an 
exception to the "best evidence rule." The theory underlying the best evidence rule was stated as 
follows: 
The best evidence rule is designed to foster accuracy in the presentation of 
evidence found in writings. No party should be permitted to prove the contents of 
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a document by secondary proof when it is within his power to produce the 
original. It is a preferential rule limited to documentary evidence. The application 
of the rule results in the exclusion of secondary evidence except when a party is 
unable, through no fault of his own, to produce the original. 
Id. at 261. 
Idaho Code § 9-411 is the codification of the best evidence rule in Idaho. Idaho Code § 9-
411 provides in relevant part: 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing itself, 
except in the following cases: 
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed; in which case proof of the loss 
or destruction must first be made. 
2. When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence 
is offered, and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice. 
3. When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public 
officer... 
Id at 261-262. 
A review of the record indicated that the bank made an adequate showing of loss and 
inability to produce the originals such that secondary evidence of the promissory notes could be 
admitted in evidence. Therefore in that case, admission of the photocopies of the notes did not 
violate the "best evidence rule" under the terms of LC. § 9-411. 
Further, compare to US. v. Diaz-Lopez, 625 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) the court held that 
the best evidence rule "requires not, as its common name implies, the best evidence in every case 
but rather the production of an original document instead of a copy." Id at 1201. But despite its 
simple name and concise definition, experience has shown that application of this principle, as 
with other difficult questions of the law of evidence, may not "safely be handled in slap-dash 
fashion." (quoting John MacArthur Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law, at v 
(1947)). Id. The modem doctrine appears to be a rule of evolving scope, with less-frequent 
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application, however, the animating purpose of the best evidence rule has been persuasively 
summarized as follows: 
Id. 
[P]resenting to a court the exact words of a writing is of more than average 
importance, particularly in the case of operative or dispositive instruments such as 
deeds, wills or contracts, where a slight variation of words may mean a great 
difference in rights. In addition, it is to be considered (1) that there has been 
substantial hazard of inaccuracy in some of the commonly utilized methods of 
making copies of writings, and (2) oral testimony purporting to give the terms of a 
writing :from memory is probably subject to a greater risk of error than oral 
testimony concerning other situations generally. The danger of mistransmitting 
critical facts which accompanies the use of written copies or recollection, but 
which is largely avoided when an original writing is presented to prove its terms, 
justifies preference for original documents. 
Finally airport operating certificates are governed by 14 CFR Part 139 which requires the 
Federal Aviation Administration to issue operating certificates to airports that 1) serve scheduled 
and unscheduled air carrier aircraft with more than 30 seats; 2) serve scheduled air carrier 
operations in aircraft with more than 9 seats but less than 31 seats; and 3) the FAA administrator 
requires to have a certificate. Airport Operating Certificates serve to ensure safety in air 
transportation and in order to obtain a certificate, an airport must agree to certain operational and 
safety standards and provide for such things as firefighting and rescue equipment. These 
requirements vary depending on the size of the airport and the type of flights available. However 
if the FAA finds that an airport is not meeting its obligations, it often imposes an administrative 
action. It can also impose a financial penalty for each day the airport continues to violate a Part 
of 139 requirements. The FAA can also revoke the airports certificate. See 14 CFR Part 139 
The State has failed to meet its burden. The State was in fact attempting to prove the 
contents of the writing, specifically that the Boise airport was federally certified, and the fact of 
recordation in this matter is not incidental or collateral. Further, no evidence was admitted into 
the record indicating that the State was unable to produce the original such that secondary 
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evidence including hearsay testimony should have been permitted. Finally, the mere existence of 
written records does not render otherwise adequate, definite, specific and competent 
testimony ipso facto speculative or uncertain however the only testimony which was admitted 
into evidence was "Yeah, it's a category -- I believe it's a category three" that testimony is 
hardly definite, specific and competent and cannot pass the test set out for the best evidence rule 
in Idaho Code § 9-411. No evidence was presented at trial that the Boise Airport held a 
certificate issued by the federal government or the State of Idaho on the day that the alleged 
incident happened. Without any evidence and more specifically the best evidence being the 
certificate itself or a duplicate of the original, regarding whether the airport did in fact hold a 
certificate from the federal government or the State of Idaho on July 28, 2012, there is not 
substantial and competent evidence to support a guilty verdict and the judgment of acquittal 
should have been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
III. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Howell 
Attempted To Knowingly Take A Weapon Into A Sterile Area Of An Airport. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Howell asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of weapon aboard 
an aircraft. Specifically, there was no or limited evidence regarding whether Mr. Howell 
knowingly attempted to carry a weapon into a sterile area of an airport. ( emphasis added.) 
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. 
Howell Attempted To Knowingly Take A Weapon Into A Sterile Area Of An Airport. 
Mr. Howell asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of weapon aboard 
an aircraft specifically that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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he attempted to enter a sterile area while knowingly carrying a deadly weapon. It is a required 
element of the crime that the State prove knowledge. Here, there was no testimony presented 
which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to come to that conclusion. 
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to 
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt 
standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of 
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,155 
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620,631 (Ill. 2004). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution. 
Id. at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, 
"[ e ]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The 
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defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." 
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873,877,908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Mr. Howell asserts that the State failed to present evidence let alone sufficient evidence 
that he knowingly attempted to enter the sterile area of an airport while carrying a deadly 
weapon. A conviction cannot be based on circumstantial evidence where such evidence is 
capable of explanation by a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Mr. Howell further 
argues that there was no evidence from which the jury in his case could draw reasonable and 
justifiable inferences of guilt. State v. Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862,810 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1991). 
On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the 
jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.1983). The Court must review the evidence, and permissible inferences 
that can be drawn reasonably from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the respondent. 
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct.App.1993). Where there was 
substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict. Id. 
In this case, the evidence which was presented at trial included testimony from Johnny 
Valero who testified that once he was in possession of the backpack, which was believed to have 
a weapon located inside he asked who the bag belonged to. (11/29/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-5.) Mr. 
Howell stepped forward immediately to claim the bag as his. (11/29/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.7-9.) Mr. 
Howell was cooperative, and complied with all commands and questions. (11/29/12 Tr., p.28, 
Ls.10-13.) There was also testimony from Michael Lock that he knew Mr. Howell was an 
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employee of Delta Airlines. (11/29/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.14-16.) That Tyler had attempted to fly out 
of Boise earlier in the morning but had been unable to. (11/29/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.17-19.) Mr. 
Howell usually kept the gun in a compartment in his motorcycle, which was parked on the 
airport premises. (11/29/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.20-24.) Mr. Howell had been unable to fly out that 
morning and so before he left the airport with family he transferred the contents of his 
motorcycle into a backpack. (11/29/12 Tr., p.57, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Howell then advised the Officer 
Lock that he had forgotten to take the weapon out of his backpack when he got home and had 
forgotten about it until he was asked about it by security. (11/29/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.2-8.) Finally 
Mr. Lock testified that if he [Tyler Howell] was purposefully trying to get a weapon into the 
airport, he could have gone through a different entrance and gotten a weapon into the airport 
because of his SIDA clearance. (11/29/12 Tr., p.58, Ls.2-13.) 
There was not substantial and competent evidence which would lead a reasonable trier of 
fact to infer that Mr. Howell knowingly attempted to enter a sterile area carrying a deadly or 
dangerous weapon. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Howell respectfully requests that this court vacate his 
judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this 23rd day of January 2014. 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 23rd day of January 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to: 
TYLER HOWELL 
587 MUDSTONE ST. 
KUNA ID 83634 
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
21 
